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Abstract This paper presents an approach for enhanc-
ing the design phase of AUTOSAR models when secu-
rity annotations are required. The approach is based on
information flow analysis and abstract interpretation.
The analysis evaluates the correctness of the model by
assessing if the flow of data is secure with respect to
causal data dependencies within the model. To find
these dependencies an exhaustive search through the
model would be required. Abstract interpretation is
used as a trade-off between the precision and complex-
ity of the analysis. The approach also provides anno-
tated models without oversizing the set of annotations.
Keywords AUTOSAR · Security · Information flow ·
Static analysis
1 Introduction
Modern automotive electronics systems are real-time
embedded systems running over networked Electronic
Control Units (ECU) interconnected by wired networks
such as the Controller Area Network (CAN) or Ether-
net. Moreover, wireless connectivity is increasingly used
for additional flexibility and bandwidth for features like
key-less entry, diagnostics, and entertainment. This in-
creased connectivity leads to an increasing number of
potential cyber-security threats. Security in automotive
systems is therefore becoming increasingly important
and should be taken into account from the early stages
of system design.
As part of recent extensions and developments, AU-
TOSAR [2], the reference standard for designing au-
tomotive systems, now offers a set of security-related
services, which provides security functions such as en-
cryption, integrity and authentication of messages ex-
changed over car networks. However, AUTOSAR does
not provide any means to specify security requirements
at the level of application components, but rather re-
quires the application developers to directly use the
standard security services. This is in contrast with the
AUTOSAR approach for scheduling and communica-
tion. Application components are not allowed to use
the basic software services for communication over net-
work buses or the operating system services. Rather,
high level specifications are provided and, based on
them, code is automatically generated by tools to define
the threads and invoke the appropriate network com-
munication services. For this reason, the AUTOSAR
component-based model has been extended by means of
a set of security annotations that are statically assigned
to components and links between components [13]. Se-
curity annotations allow us to specify trust levels on
components and integrity and confidentiality require-
ments on communication links.
A proper security annotation depends on both the
criticality of functionalities to be protected and the
causal dependencies between data. Intuitively, if, for
example, a safety-critical component requires the in-
tegrity of input data then we have to protect integrity
along the whole path from data origin, e.g. sensors, to
the component. Unfortunately, AUTOSAR only pro-
vides limited information about data causal dependen-
cies. AUTOSAR provides information about ports each
runnable (i.e. a functional unit running within a com-
ponent) reads and writes. Such a coarse grain notion
of data causal dependency may cause a redundant se-
curity annotation. Intuitively, this means that we may
end up to protect certain data paths that do not actu-
ally influence a given critical functionality with a con-
2sequent excessive utilisation of security-related services
and consequent negative impact on performance and
real-time constraints. This issue is particularly relevant
in the automotive domain where software components
run on resource-limited computer networks.
In this paper we propose a method to discover data
dependencies with a finer level of granularity than AU-
TOSAR, by analysing the code of runnables. The anal-
ysis of data dependencies is based on abstract interpre-
tation [16], a static analysis technique for the automatic
extraction of information about the possible executions
of programs.
A further contribution of the paper is the definition
of the Data secure flow property of AUTOSAR models.
Data secure flow verifies that, taking into consideration
data causalities, the security annotations in the model
are properly assigned. The data dependencies computed
with our method can be exploited to strategically an-
notate an AUTOSAR model in such a way that the
Data secure flow is verified, and the security services
are efficiently used.
One of the advantages of our approach is that, be-
ing based on abstract interpretation, the analysis can
be fully automated. Moreover, the analysis scales up,
since runnables of AUTOSAR software components are
analysed separately.
As a last contribution, the tool ADEPT (Autosar
DEPendencies Tool) has been developed to support the
analysis. The tool has been applied to a case study to
show the application of the proposed method.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reports
on related work. Section 3 introduces the background
on AUTOSAR models and information flow analysis.
Section 4 provides a comprehensive description of the
proposed approach. Section 5 describes the implemen-
tation of the method, and provides information on the
developed tool. Section 6 shows the application of the
approach to a case study.
2 Related work
This section reports on the research works about auto-
motive security issues and information flow analysis.
2.1 Security
Recent research has shown that it is possible for exter-
nal intruders to intentionally compromise the proper
operation and functionality of modern automotive elec-
tronics systems. In [22], it has been demonstrated that
if an adversary were able to communicate on one or
more of a car internal network buses, then this capa-
bility could be sufficient to maliciously control critical
components across the entire car.
The work [15] demonstrated that external attacks
are indeed feasible and it also categorised external at-
tack vectors as a function of the attacker ability to
deliver malicious input via particular modes: indirect
physical access, short-range wireless access, and long-
range wireless access. Further remote attacks have been
recently demonstrated in [37].
Security has been taken into account in the early
phases of the development cycle of automotive electron-
ics systems, both by enforcing software programming
standards that prevent software defects that may enable
cyber-attacks [15], as well as by implementing security
mechanisms for secure communication [24,25], includ-
ing software delivery, installation and flashing [1,35].
Factors like Required Resources and Required Know-
How have been considered in the SAHARA (Security-
Aware Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment) method
for defining threats criticality [27].
In [13,14] a set of modelling extensions has been
defined to address AUTOSAR cyber-security require-
ments at design stage. Security requirements are mod-
elled as stereotypes extending the AUTOSAR imple-
mentation provided by the IBM Rhapsody tool [18]. A
similar approach has been used in SecureUML to model
systems with role-based access control policies [26], and
in umlsec to specify confidentiality properties of mes-
sage communication [19]. Concepts and mechanisms
that allow us to model confidentiality and authenti-
cation requirements at a higher abstraction level have
been proposed in [32].
2.2 Data flow
Data flow in AUTOSAR models is analysed in the ap-
plication configuration phase, where runnables must be
grouped into tasks. Tasks are the unit of scheduling
of the AUTOSAR operating system and they are exe-
cuted in sequence. If a runnable reads data produced by
another runnable, the first runnable cannot start until
the second runnable finishes. The dependencies among
runnables are computed by assuming that any commu-
nication implemented between two runnables represents
a dependency [20].
The dependencies among runnables enable a cor-
rect parallel execution of runnables, so they must be
respected even in the migration from single core to
multi-core architectures [30], [20]. In [21] a tool for sup-
porting parallel execution is developed. The tool exe-
cutes data dependency analysis directly on AUTOSAR
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models to detect critical dependencies. The static data
dependency analysis approach is defined in [31].
All approaches above apply data-flow analysis to ob-
tain the dependencies among runnables for identifying
a proper execution order of runnables. The dependen-
cies are computed by considering their accessed data.
If any execution path of a runnable receives data on a
port, the runnable depends on the runnable that sent
such data.
In our work, the result of a data flow analysis, is
the basis for checking the secure data flow in security
annotated AUTOSAR models. For what concerns the
data flow analysis, our approach differs from those men-
tioned above because we find dependencies at a finer
granularity level: our iterative data flow analysis com-
putes dependencies among data read from or written
onto ports of the whole AUTOSAR model. Data se-
cure flow property is computed by an algorithm that
abstracts real values from data and considers only the
security level of the data. The term ”security level” is
related to the security properties that data must sat-
isfy. The higher the security level, the more properties
have to be guaranteed. The abstract interpretation ap-
proach has been used for both the implementation of
the data-flow analysis and the checking of secure flow
property.
2.3 Secure flow
Data flow analysis is the basis for secure information
flow in programs. The secure flow property in pro-
grams was first formulated in [11]. Successively, in [17],
program certification was addressed, which statically
checks secure information flow by inspecting the de-
pendencies among variables in the program.
Works on static analysis techniques for information
flow security in programs can be divided into type-
based approaches and semantic-based approaches. In
type-based approaches the security of a variables be-
longs to its type and secure information flow is checked
by type systems [36,12]. An approach has been pre-
sented in [38] based on a continuation passing style
translation of programs (continuations are used to han-
dle implicit flows), while the work [9] handles secure in-
formation flow in object oriented languages. In semantic-
based approaches, abstract interpretation is applied.
For example, the work [29] presents a method based
on denotational semantics, while the works [10] [8] are
based on the operational semantics. In [23] an approach
is presented based on axiomatic semantics, while the
work [34] defines a method based on partial equivalence
relations. The reader can refer to [33] for a survey.
The approach proposed in this paper relies on ab-
stract interpretation of the operational semantics. The
analysis is based on a transition system and thus has
the advantage of being fully automatic. Our work dif-
fers from previous work because in AUTOSAR, we have
both a set of component based modelling constructs,
and a programming language used to describe the be-
haviour of runnable entities. Moreover, with respect to
[10], data types and functions are included in the anal-
ysis.
3 Basic Concepts
This section provides an introduction to AUTOSAR
and some basic knowledge about information flow anal-
ysis.
3.1 AUTOSAR
AUTOSAR is an open industry standard for automo-
tive software architecture, founded in 2003 and devel-
oped by a partnership of automotive Original Equip-
ment Manufacturers (OEMs), suppliers and tool ven-
dors [2]. AUTOSAR provides both a standard language
for the description of application components and their
interfaces, and a methodology for the development pro-
cess. A fundamental concept in AUTOSAR is the sepa-
ration between application and infrastructure, see Fig-
ure 1. In particular, AUTOSAR defines a three-layered
architecture consisting of:
– The Application layer
– The Runtime Environment (RTE) layer
– The Basic Software (BSW) layer
The Application Layer contains the Software Com-
ponents (SWCs) developed for the automotive system
functions by suppliers. The RTE layer is a middleware
layer, automatically generated by tools and providing
a communication abstraction for software components.
Finally, the BSW layer provides basic services and ba-
sic software modules to software components. Within
the BSW layer, AUTOSAR makes security mechanisms
available to the developers in three different modules:
a) the Secure On-board Communication (SecOC) mod-
ule [7], which routes IPDUs (Interaction layer Protocol
Data Units) with security requirements; b) the Crypto
Abstraction Library (CAL) [5], which implements a li-
brary of cryptographic functions; and, finally, c) the
Crypto Service Manager (CSM) [6], which provides soft-
ware components with cryptographic functions imple-
mented in software or hardware.
4Fig. 1 AUTOSAR architecture.
The SWCs in the application layer communicate
using ports that express client-server relationships or
sender-receiver data interactions. The development of
the SWCs relies on the RTE specified by AUTOSAR
to deliver the conceptual foundation for the communi-
cation of SWCs with each other and the use of BSW
services. The internal behaviour of SWCs consists of
runnables or functional units, represented by a func-
tion entry point. Each runnable indicates the port it
uses. Runnables internal to a SWC can communicate
also through global variables and inter-runnable vari-
ables.
An example is shown in Figure 2. Runnable1a
of SWC1 communicates with Runnable2a of SWC2
through sender-receiver ports; Runnable1c of SWC1
communicates withRunnable1a of the same SWC
through an inter-runnable variable. Moreover,
Runnable2c of SWC2 communicates with Runnable1d
of SWC1 through a client-server port.
In [13], AUTOSAR models are extended with secu-
rity annotations. In short, two modelling extensions are
introduced:
– the trust level of a software component, or of a port
– the security requirement of a communication link
A software component (or a port) may be associated
with a trust level which specifies to what extent it can
be trusted to provide the expected function, or service,
with respect to attacks targeting the component itself.
Ports inherits the trust level of the SWC. Without loss
of generality, we assume two trust levels: high and low.
A communication link may be associated with a secu-
rity requirement which represents the level of security
that data sent on the link must satisfy. The security
requirement can take one of the following values: none,
conf, integr, both, which, respectively, codify no secu-
rity, confidentiality, integrity and, both confidentiality
and integrity. During the design phase of the automo-
tive system, designers can assign these annotations to
components and links according to their knowledge of
the system.
As an example, let us consider the annotated AU-
TOSAR model shown in Figure 3. The example repre-
sents a typical active safety application that makes use
of information coming from sensory input devices (e.g.,
lidars, radars, cameras, and GPS) in order to sense the
surrounding environment and detect road marks and
objects (e.g., vehicles, pedestrians) on and around the
street. These information items are forwarded to sev-
eral navigation and active safety functions, including,
for example, Path planning, Lane keeping and Lane De-
parture warning, which produce commands for the ac-
tuation systems (steering, throttle and brakes).
The PathPlanning software component and port p
of the Throttle software component are assigned high
trust level, while the other elements are assigned low.
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Fig. 2 An example of AUTOSAR application model.
The Throttle request link is annotated with integrity
security requirement (integr), while the other commu-
nication links have no security requirements (none).
Therefore, according to annotations, data input to the
Throttle component at port p, on the Throttle request
link, must have a high trust level and integrity security
requirement (integr).
3.2 Secure information flow
In this section we briefly recall basic concepts of secure
information flow in a program [17].
A program, with variables partitioned into two dis-
joint sets of high and low security, has secure informa-
tion flow if observations of the final value of the low
security variables do not reveal any information about
the initial values of the high security ones.
Assume y is a high security variable and x a low se-
curity one. Examples of violation of secure information
flow are:
– x := y;
– if (y = 0) then x := 0; else x := 1;
In both cases, checking the final value of the low
security variable x reveals information on the value of
the higher security variable y. In the first case, there is
an explicit information flow from y to x (variable x is
assigned the value of y). In the second case there is an
implicit information flow from y to x, since variable x is
assigned different values depending on the value of the
condition of the control instruction if, that depends on
variable y.
A conditional instruction in a program causes the
beginning of an implicit flow. The implicit flow begins
when the conditional instruction starts (we say that we
have an opened implicit flow); all the instructions in the
scope of the if depends on the level of the condition
of the if. In case of nested conditional instructions,
we have the dependency from all the conditions of the
opened implicit flows.
Information flow occurs also through global vari-
ables and function calls in the program. Finally, when
a function call is executed in the scope of a conditional
instruction, the function is executed under the implicit
flow. For example,
– if (y < 0) then f();
Function f() is invoked depending on the value of
variable y. Instructions in the code of f() are executed
only if the value of variable y is less than 0. Instruc-
tions of f() are executed under the implicit flow of the
condition of the if statement.
The analysis of secure information flow can be ex-
ecuted using an abstract interpretation approach [16]
based on the operational semantics of the language [10].
In this case
– the standard operational semantics of the program-
ming language is enhanced to include information
on security level of values.
– abstract domains are identified and abstract seman-
tics rules are defined that execute the program on
abstract domains that contain only security levels.
– the abstract rules compute the flow of information
in the program.
In the following, the basic concepts of the analysis
are shown. A program is a sequence of instructions
q = q0q1 · · · qn. Let m be a memory that contains all the
6Fig. 3 An example of security annotated model in Rhapsody.
variables accessed by the program. The execution of the
program is a transition system obtained by executing
q starting from the initial memory m, by applying the
rules of the operational semantics of the language.




where A is the antecedent and C is the
consequent. The intuitive interpretation of a rule is that
the consequent can be inferred from the antecedent.
Given a pair 〈qi,m〉 of an instruction qi and a mem-
ory m, −→ represents the execution of qi in m. The
rule for a simple expression consisting of a variable x is:
Expr 〈x,m〉 −→ m(x)
An empty antecedent corresponds to the boolean
value true. It is always true (antecedent) that the eval-
uation of the expression x is the value of x in m (con-
sequent). The rule for the assignment is :
Ass
〈e,m〉 −→ k
〈x :=e,m〉 −→ m[k/x]
If the evaluation of the expression e in memory m
is k (antecedent), then the execution of x:=e changes
memory m, by assigning value k to variable x (con-
sequent). We assume m[k/x] is a memory equal to m
except for the variable x that is assigned k.
The operational semantics of the language is ex-
tended to convey the security level of data during the
execution. We added two elements to the execution:
– annotated values. Each value is annotated with a
security level τ , which considers the security level
of all data on which the value depends.
Data become pairs (k, τ), where k is the value and
τ is the security level.
– execution environment. Each instruction qi is exe-
cuted under an environment σ that represents the
level of the implicit flows caused by conditional in-
structions. For example, the level of a variable is
given by the highest level between the level of the
data in the variable and the level of the environment
in which the instruction is executed.
We use the pair 〈mˆ, Env〉 to represent the memory
defined on extended values (mˆ) and the execution envi-
ronment (Env). The inference rules above become the
following:
Expr
mˆ(x) = (k, τ)
〈x, (mˆ, σ)〉 −→ (k, σ ∪ τ)
The notation 〈x, (mˆ, σ)〉 represents the evaluation
of variable x in memory mˆ under the environmnt σ.
Ass
〈e, (mˆ, σ)〉 −→ (k, τ ′)
〈x:=e, (mˆ, σ)〉 −→ mˆ[(k, τ ′)/x]
The notation 〈e, (mˆ, σ)〉 represents the evaluation of
expression e in memory mˆ under the environmnt σ.
If the level of the expression e is (k, τ ′) (antecedent),
then the assignment updates the memory mˆ assigning
(k, τ ′) to variable x (consequent).
The abstract semantics abstracts from actual values
and maintains only dependency levels. Let M be the
abstract memory.
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The inference rules above become:
Expr
M(x) = τ
〈x, (M,σ)〉 −→ σ ∪ τ
Ass
〈e, (M,σ)〉 −→ τ ′
〈x:=e, (M,σ)〉 −→ M [τ ′/x]
A program is executed on the abstract domain start-
ing from the abstract initial memory, and applying the
abstract rules. In the abstract execution, all branches of
conditional/iterative instructions are always executed,
due to the loss of real data in the abstract semantics.
Then the execution of the program with the abstract
semantics captures all information flows.
4 Proposed approach
Given an annotated model, the main steps of the pro-
posed approach are:
1. the computation of data dependencies;
2. the verification of data secure flow property;
3. the possible improvement of annotations.
We first give an overview of the proposed approach
in subsection 4.1. Then, for the sake of simplicity, we
introduce steps 2 and 3 in subsection 4.2 and, finally,
we describe step 1 in subsection 4.3.
4.1 Overview
In the analysis, data are assigned a pair
〈trust level, security requirement〉
that characterises their degree of security during all the
possible executions. The initial values of trust level
and security requirement are the most secure trust
level and the most secure security requirement, respec-
tively. As data flow through the components and the
communication links, their degree of security is down-
graded with the less secure annotation encountered.
Given an AUTOSAR model, data secure flow is
verified if the degree of security of data sent on a
link has no lower trust level and no lower security
requirement than those assigned by the designer
through the security annotations.
In particular, an AUTOSAR model satisfies data
secure flow if for each link l = (pi, pj)
– the trust level of data sent on link l is not lower than
the security annotation of port pj ;
– the security requirement of data sent on link l is not
lower than the security annotation of link l.
Let us consider the AUTOSAR model shown in Fig-
ure 3. The model is correct if data sent on the Throt-
tle request link have a trust level greater than or equal
to high, because the port p on the Throttle component
has been assigned high.
Let us assume every component consists of a sin-
gle runnable. Using the dependencies available in AU-
TOSAR, data sent by PathPlanning depend on all the
inputs of PathPlanning. Therefore the trust level of
data sent on the Throttle request link is the lowest level
of the traversed components (Camera, Lidar, Radar,
GPS, etc.), low in this case. (By default, if not explic-
itly assigned, the trust level of components and the
security requirement of links is the lowest level (low
and none, respectively)).
The model is not correct, and to satisfy secure flow,
all these components must be assigned high. However,
this set of high trust level components can be over-
sized, because it does not rely on real dependencies.
Let’s consider the case in which real dependencies for
output data of PathPlanning are known (dotted lines
internal to the component in the figure). Since data sent
on the Throttle request ultimately depend only on data
produced by GPS, secure flow is verified by simply as-
signing a high trust level to GPS. The resulting set of
high trust level components is smaller than the previ-
ous one, thus reducing the overhead caused by security
operations.
Similar reasoning applies to links. With reference to
Figure 3, data on the Throttle request link must have
integrity security requirement (integr). Only knowing
the ports each runnable reads and writes, data sent on
the Throttle request link depend on data at the input
ports of the component PathPlanning, thus in order to
satisfy secure flow all the involved links must guaran-
tee integrity. Using the real dependencies, it is suffi-
cient that the Vehicle position communication link is
assigned integr security requirement.
To have exact information on data dependencies re-
quires knowing the code of runnables, and runnables
must be executed on every possible input resulting in
high complexity. This work proposes a solution based
on a trade-off between the precision of the analysis and
its complexity. An approximation of the real data de-
pendency is computed using an abstract interpretation
approach, which statically computes dependencies by
abstracting from real values and considering only de-
pendency levels. As a consequence, the set of causal
dependencies found can be still oversized with respect
to the exact dependencies, but it is more accurate with
respect to the set obtained using the AUTOSAR infor-
mation.
84.2 Data secure flow property
Given an AUTOSAR model, we use the following no-
tations and definitions:
– C = {c1, c2, · · · , ck} is the set of SWCs.
– R is the set of all runnables.
– V IR is the set of inter-runnable variables, V G is the
set of global variables of SWCs.
– P = {p1, · · · , pn} is the set of ports of SWCs.
– L = {l1, · · · , lm} is the set of links. A link denotes
a connection between two ports. Link l = (pi, pj)
connects port pi to port pj , with pi output port of
the sender SWC and pj input port of the receiver
SWC.
– cmp(p) is the component to which port p belongs.
– trustlevel(c) is the trust level assigned to software
component c.
– trustlevel(c, p) is the trust level assigned to port
p of software component c.
– securityreq(l) is the security requirement assigned
to link l.
– Deps:P → 2P is the function that provides the de-
pendencies of ports. Deps(p) is the set of ports on
which the data written onto port p depend.
Let us introduce the following definitions.
Definition 1 (lattice) Let A be a set and @ an order
relation on A. The pair (A,@) is a lattice if every pair
of elements in A has both a greatest lower bound (glb)
and a least upper bound (lub).
Definition 2 (trust level) Let A = {low, high} be
the set of trust levels, ordered by low @ high, where @
is the lower between levels. (A,@) is a lattice. We have
that glb(low, high) = low and lub(low, high) = high.
Definition 3 (security requirement) Let
B = {conf, integr, both, none} be the set of secu-
rity requirements of links, partially ordered by the @,
with none @ conf @ both and none @ integr @ both.
(B,@) is a lattice. We have that conf and integr
are not ordered with respect to each other, because
one is not ”lower in security degree” than the other,
glb(integr, conf) = none and lub(integr, conf) = both.
Definition 4 (Data secure flow property) Given
an AUTOSAR model with security annotations, the
model satisfies the data secure flow property if for each
link l = (pi, pj) ∈ L:
δl 6@ trustlevel(c, pj) ∧ µl 6@ securityreq(l)
where c = cmp(pj) and, δl and µl are the lowest trust
level and the lowest security requirement of data sent
onto link l.
In the analysis, we compute δl and µl with the algo-
rithm shown in Listing 1. The output of the algorithm
is highly dependent on function Deps.
Given a link l = (pi, pj) ∈ L,
1. 〈δl, µl〉 = 〈high, both〉;
2. ∀p ∈ Deps(pi):
δl = glb(δl, trustlevel(cmp(p)));
3. ∀l′ = (q, q′) | q, q′ ∈ Deps(p):
µl = glb(µl, securityreq(l
′)).
Listing 1 Algorithm for data security of link l.
Given a link l = (pi, pj) ∈ L,
1. 〈δl, µl〉 are computed by Listing 1;





3. if µl @ securityreq(l) then
∀l′ = (p′i, p′j) | p′i, p′j ∈ Deps(pj):
securityreq(l′) =
lub(securityreq(l), securityreq(l′)).
Listing 2 Algorithm for updating the security annotations.
Let’s assume l = (pi, pj). Data sent to the link are
data written onto port pi. First the algorithm sets δl
equal to the greatest trust level and µl equal to the
greatest security requirement. Then for each port p on
which data sent on the link l depends (p ∈ Deps(pi)), δl
is updated to consider the trust level of the port p: the
trust level δl is set equal to the greatest lower bound
between the current value and the trust level of the
SWC to which port p belongs. Finally, for each link l′
traversed by data sent on link l (source and destination
ports of l′ belong to Deps(pi)), µl is set equal to the
greatest lower bound between the current value and the
security requirement of the link l′. Note that, at each
step δl and µl can only be downgraded. Listing 1 is
applied to each link within the AUTOSAR annotated
model.
In order to satisfy the data secure flow prop-
erty it is possible to update the annotated model as
shown in Listing 2. Every link is analysed. For each
link l = (pi, pj) that violates the property (δl @
trustlevel(cmp(pj)) or µl @ securityreq(l)) it is
sufficient to accordingly increase the trust level of com-
ponents whose ports belongs to Deps(pj) (point 2 in
the listing) and the security requirement of the links
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whose source and destination ports belongs to Deps(pj)
(point 3 in the listing).
The fulfilment of data secure flow property is highly
dependent on function Deps. For example by choosing
an approach based on the information provided by AU-
TOSAR, we overestimate the set of dependencies, lead-
ing to the need for more security operations. By using
an approach that analyses all the possible extecutions
of runnables on the real input data we can implement a
Deps function that retrieves the minimal set of depen-
dencies. Our approach is set at an intermediate level of
accuracy between the two.
4.3 Dependencies between data in AUTOSAR
In the previous section we defined the data secure flow
property and how to use it to improve an annotated
model, in the following we define Deps used in our ap-
proach.
Let us consider an AUTOSAR model. Data written
at port pj does not depend on data read from port pi (pj
does not depend on pi for short) if, changing the data
at pi, the data written onto pj are always the same. We
formally define port dependencies as follows.
Definition 5 (Port dependencies) Given a model,
let pj(p1, · · · , pi−1, v, pi+1, · · · , pn) be the data written
onto port pj when v is read from input port pi. A port
pj does not depend on the port pi if:
for each possible execution, for each pair of data v1, v2
at pi, with v1 6= v2, it is:
pj(p1, · · · , pi−1, v1, pi+1, · · · , pn) =
pj(p1, · · · , pi−1, v2, pi+1, · · · , pn)
Dependencies between data are computed by apply-
ing an abstract interpretation approach, similar to the
one described in Section 3. The difference is that in our
work the abstract domain consists of port levels instead
of security levels.
4.3.1 Dependency levels.
In the analysis we define the set of data dependency
levels Σ as the power-set of P : Σ = 2P , i.e. the set
of all subsets of P , ordered by subset inclusion. The
set Σ with the ordering relation ⊆ is a lattice (Σ,⊆)
(i.e., every pair of elements of Σ has both a greatest
lower bound, glb, and a least upper bound, lub). The
lub is given by the union (∪) and the glb is given by
the intersection of subsets (∩). Given X ⊆ Y , X ∪
Y = Y and X ∩ Y = X. The singleton set {pi}, (pi
for short) denotes a dependency from port pi. The set
{pi, pj} denotes dependency on both ports pi and pj .
The minimum of Σ is the empty set ∅, the maximum
is {p1, p2, · · · , pn}(P for short).
We extend an AUTOSAR model with the lattice of
dependency levels (Σ,⊆).
4.3.2 Analysis of an AUTOSAR model
Let us now consider the analysis of an AUTOSAR
model. The basic idea consists in modelling ports as
variables, and runnables as functions.
In particular,
– for sender-receiver data communications, reading
data from a port is equivalent to reading a variable;
writing data onto a port is equivalent to writing a
variable.
– for client-server communications, the client request
is equivalent to a function call, which corresponds
to the invocation of the runnable implementing the
requested service.
Runnables are functions, with arguments (passed by
value or by reference) and return. In addition to a lo-
cal memory, runnables have access to a global mem-
ory that maintains inter-runnable variables, global vari-
ables of SWCs, and communication ports. We call the
set of these elements global context. In particular, in
the analysis, runnables are executed in a global context
A and in a local context 〈M,Env〉, which consists of a
local memory M and an execution environment Env,
see Subsection 2.3.
Since runnables are Misra-C compliant [3], we need
to deal with pointers, structures and arrays. Misra-C
[28] is a subset of C language, specifically addressed for
safety-critical systems.
In particular:
– a pointer is assumed to be a simple variable, that
maintains the dependencies of the pointer, plus the
dependencies of the pointed data in the abstract
execution.
– a structured variable is mapped to a set of simple
variables, one for each member (we use the · nota-
tion, as usual). If we have a variable data that is
a structure with two fields a and b, we map such
a variable into two simple variables, named data.a
and data.b, respectively.
– An array is assumed to be a simple variable, that
maintains all the dependencies of each element in
the array.
The analysis of an AUTOSAR model is based on an
iterative process that performs the abstract execution
of all runnables in R, using the global context file. If
during the analysis a level in the global context file





select r ∈ T
T := T − {r}




Listing 3 Analysis of an AUTOSAR model
The main steps of the iterative analysis are shown
in Listing 3, where A0 is the initial global context file.
The analysis uses the abstract interpreter EXEC to
analyse a single runnable. EXEC performs an abstract
execution of the runnable starting from a global context
file A and producing a new global context file A′.
The analysis terminates when, starting from a global
context file, all runnables are executed and the global
context is not changed.
At the end of the analysis the global context file
records the dependencies for ports of all the SWCs. The
approach is conservative, in the sense that all possible
dependencies for any real execution of the runnables
are detected. False dependencies are possible, since, for
example, in the abstract analysis all branches of con-
trol instructions are executed, even those that in real
execution would never have been executed.
Note that our approach analyses runnables indepen-
dently of one another. The analysis does not require
the explicit construction of the complete call graph of
runnables that would generally result in a large number
of states. Moreover, the approach scales well in terms of
computational time with the size of the system because
all the runnables can be analysed in parallel.
5 Implementation
This section provides the practical methods used to
implement the analysis depicted in the previous sec-
tion. We focus on the resolution of RTE calls, global
and local contexts management and abstract execution
of runnables.This section also provides an example to
better clarify the analysis. Finally this section provides
details on the architecture of the tool implemented.
5.1 Calls to RTE functions
In the following we show how to deal with calls to RTE
functions in the runnable code, through a few exem-
plary cases.
– Data communication ports
RTE functions for reading from or writing onto ports
are mapped so as to read from and write onto the
port variable. For the sake of simplicity, the name
of the port variable is the same name as the port.
The ReturnType Rte Write Port o(data) func-
tion, where data is the function’s argument and o
is the port, is implemented as the assignment o =
data.
The ReturnType Rte Read Port o() function,
which returns the data read from port o, is imple-
mented as the expression o.
– Service ports
RTE functions that invoke remote services trigger
the runnable that implements the service. The func-
tion implementing the service is invoked.
The function ReturnType Rte Call Port o(data),
where o is the service (runnable) within the client-
server interface and data are the arguments of o, is
implemented as o(data).
5.2 Global Context and local context
The global context records information on variables in
the global memory of SWCs, communication ports of
SWCs and runnable calls.
The global context file maintains:
– for each variable v ∈ IRV ∪GV ∪P , the entry v : τ ,
where τ ∈ Σ is the dependency level of v;
– for each runnable r ∈ R, the entry r(τ1, ..., τk)τ ;σ,
where τ1, ..., τk are the levels for the actual param-
eter, τ is the level for the return and σ is the level
of the environment under which the runnable is ex-
ecuted (calling environment).
During the analysis, for each variable, the global
context maintains the maximum dependency level of
data recorded in the variable and, for each runnable,
the global context maintains the maximum level of the
arguments, the maximum level of the return and the
maximum level of the environment, by considering all
the possible invocations.
On the other hand, the local context of the runnable is
the pair (M,Env). The local memory M contains lo-
cal variables (including variables modelling arguments
passed by value), and the environment Env which is
the level of the implicit flow caused by conditional in-
structions. The return of a runnable and runnable’s ar-
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guments passed by reference are handled as global vari-
ables.
At the beginning of the analysis, the global context
A is initialised as follows:
– each port variable pi depends only on itself, and so
it is initialised to the level {pi} ∈ Σ.
– all other variables are initially assigned to the lowest
level (∅).
– runnables are initially assigned ∅ for calling environ-
ment, parameters and return.
For the local context, the local memory M is ini-
tialised as follows:
– local variables are initialised to ∅ .
– variables corresponding to arguments passed by val-
ues are initialised to the level of the argument in the
local context.
The execution environment Env is initialised with
the level of the calling environment of the runnable en-
try in the global context file.
Listing 4 shows an example of the general structure
of a global context file. In the example, runnable run1()
has one argument passed by value, and one argument
passed by reference (denoted by arg& hereinafter).
The global context is used to take into account
the interactions between runnables. Any update to
the global context is permanent, and visible to other
runnables. The local context of a runnable is deallo-
cated when the analysis of the runnable terminates.
5.3 Abstract execution of a runnable
A runnable is executed by an abstract interpreter EXEC
which takes as input the CFG of the runnable. In the
CFG the instructions are grouped in Basic Blocks (bb).
Each type of instruction is assigned an abstract ex-
ecution rule. The abstract execution of an instruction,
updates the local context (M,Env), and the global con-
text A. EXEC examines one bb at a time and abstractly
executes each instruction of the block, and propagates
the updates ((M,Env) and A obtained after the exe-
cution of the instructions) to successor blocks. Instruc-
tions in the scope of the conditional block, are executed
under the implicit flow of the condition of the control
instruction in the conditional block. The set of abstract
rules is shown in Appendix A.
Examples of CFGs are shown in Figure 4 and Fig-
ure 5. In the first case there is an if instruction, while
the second shows an example of a while instruction
(see Listing 5).
% Begin Global Context
% g l o b a l v a r i a b l e s o f SWCs
gv1 = {}
gv2 = {}
. . . . .
% IRV of SWCs
i r v 1 = {}
i r v 2 = {}
. . . . .
% por t s o f SWCs
p1 = {p1}
p2 = {p2}
. . . .
% runnables o f SWCs
run (a ,{} ) {} ; {}
run1 ( ( b , {} ) , ( c&, {} ) ) {} ; {}
run2 ( ) {} ; {}
. . . . .
%End Global Context
Listing 4 An example of initial global context.
Fig. 4 CFG of runnable1 with if.
In Figure 4 blocks in the scope of the if statement
(block 2), are blocks 3 and 4 (which are the successors
of block 2).
In Figure 5, we note that the while statement is
translated into a repeated if instruction (block 4). In
this case only one of the successors of the conditional
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Fig. 5 CFG of runnable2 with while.
block (block 3) is in the scope of the if.
int runnable1 (int a) {




int runnable2 (int a) {
while (a>200)
a = a -10;
return a;
}
Listing 5 Code of runnables.
EXEC iteratively performs the abstract execution
of the runnable starting from an initial local context
〈M,Env〉 and an initial global context A until a fix-
point is reached (i.e., during an iteration 〈M,Env〉 and
A are updated, and the analysis terminates when the
local and global context at the beginning and at the
end of the iteration are the same). The order in which
blocks are executed is not important, because if the A
or 〈M,Env〉 change, all blocks are re-executed.
EXEC uses a table Q that implements the local con-
text of a runnable (local memory M plus calling envi-
ronment Env). Q consists of a row Qi for each bb i in
the CFG.
If Qi = 〈M,σ〉, we have that M contains the level of
the local variables when block i is executed, and σ is the
level of the environment in which block i is executed.
Qi is named before-state of block i.
The execution of the instructions of block i starts
from the before-state of i. The execution of the instruc-
tions generates a new state 〈M ′, Env′〉, named after-
state of block i. The after-state is obtained as the result
of the abstract execution of each instruction, according
to the abstract rules in Appendix A.
After the execution of all instructions of block i, the
content of the memory M ′ in the after-state is propa-
gated to the successors of i. For each successor j, the
before-state of j (row Qj in the table) is updated by
executing the lub operation between the memory of the
after-state of block i with the memory of Qj .
We naturally extend the lub operation to memories.
This corresponds to the least upper bound executed
point-wise on each variable in the memory:
lub(M,M ′) : ∀var,M(var) = M(var) ∪M ′(var).
Qentry and Qexit represent the entry and the exit block
of the runnable, respectively.
Table T summarises information on bbs of the
runnable. The column Code contains the code of the
bb, the column Succ. enumerates the successors of the
bb and the column Scope reports the blocks in scope of
bb. Table 1 shows T for runnable2 in Figure 5.
The set of abstract rules is shown in Appendix A.
5.4 An example
Let’s consider runnable2 in Figure 5. Assume we have
the following fragment of global context:
% Begin Global Context
....
runnable2((a, {p2})) 0 : {p1}
...
% End Global Context
The initial local context Q is shown in Table 2. The
environment of each row is initialised with the value of
the calling environment in the global context file ({p1}).
The memory of Qentry is computed as follows: local
variables are all assigned the minimum level (∅), ex-
cept the variable corresponding to argument a which
assumes the value present in the global context file
({p2}). All the variables in the memory of other blocks
are assigned the minimum level ∅.
In the following, MQi is the memory of the before-
state of Qi and M
′
Qi
denotes the memory of the after-
state of Qi.
Let blocks be scheduled in ascending order of i.
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Table 1 Table T of runnable2.
Block Code Succ. Scope
Qentry 2
Q2 goto bb4; 4
Q3 a = a-10; 4
Q4 if (a > 200) goto bb3 3, 5 3
else goto bb5
Q5 d = a 6
Q6 return d exit
Qexit
Table 2 Initial local context Q of runnable2.
Block Memory Env
Qentry (a, p2) (d, ∅) p1
Q2 (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
Q3 (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
Q4 (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
Q5 (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
Q6 (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
Qexit (a, ∅) (d, ∅) p1
– Block entry simply initialises the memory of its suc-
cessor (block 2) MQ2 = ((a, p2)(d, ∅)).
– Block 2 is executed. The rule for goto does not
change the memory, so M ′Q2 = MQ2 . Block 2 prop-
agates the after-state to its successor (block 4):
MQ4 = lub(MQ4 ,M
′
Q2
) = ((a, p2)(d, ∅)).
– When block 3 is executed, the rule of the assignment
is applied. The lub between the environment (p1)
and the level of a in M (that is ∅) is computed and
assigned to a. M ′Q3 = ((a, {p1})(d, ∅)). The memory
of the successor blocks is updated:




MQ4 = ((a, p2)(d, ∅)) ∪ ((a, {p1})(d, ∅)). That is,
MQ4 = ((a, {p1, p2})(d, ∅)).
– Block 4 is executed and the rule for if is applied.
The level of the condition is {p1, p2}. The environ-
ment of the blocks in the scope of block 4 is up-
dated, i.e., Env of block 3 becomes {p1, p2}. Then
MQ3 = lub(MQ3 ,M
′
Q4
) = ((a, {p1, p2})(d, ∅)) and
MQ5 = lub(MQ5 ,M
′
Q4
) = ((a, {p1, p2})(d, ∅)).
– The execution of block 5, assigns {p1, p2} to d:
M ′Q5 = ((a, {p1, p2})(d, {p1, p2}))
The after-state is propagated to the successor:




((a, {p1, p2})(d, {p1, p2})).
– The execution of block 6, according to the rule
for return, assigns {p1, p2} to the return of the
runnable in the global context file A and propagates
the memory (M ′Q6 = MQ6) in the after-state to
block exit.
Table 3 Local context Q of runnable2 after the first iteration
(equal to the table at fixpoint).
Block Memory Env
Qentry (a, p2) (d, ∅) p1
Q2 (a, p2) (d, ∅) p1
Q3 (a, {p1, p2}) (d, ∅) {p1, p2}
Q4 (a, {p1, p2}) (d, ∅) p1
Q5 (a, {p1, p2}) (d, ∅) p1
Q6 (a, {p1, p2}) (d, {p1, p2}) p1
Qexit (a, {p1, p2}) (d, {p1, p2}) p1
MQexit = lub(MQexit ,M
′
Q6
). Therefore, MQexit =
lub(((a, ∅)(d, ∅)), ((a, {p1, p2})(d, {p1, p2}))
= ((a, {p1, p2})(d, {p1, p2})).
When all the blocks have been analysed, the first
iteration terminates. Local context Q obtained at the
end of the first iteration is shown in Table 3.
The global context file, at the end of the iteration
is the following:
% Begin Global Context
....
run((a, p2)) {p1, p2} : p1
...
% End Global Context
Another iteration needs to be executed, because the
context has been changed. At the end of the second
iteration, since Table 3 does not change, the fixpoint is
reached and EXEC terminates.
5.5 The tool
In the following we describe the architecture of the
ADEPT tool (Autosar DEPencencies Tool) for com-
puting data dependencies in AUTOSAR models.
The tool requires the CFG of the runnable entities and
the global context structure to compute the ports de-
pendencies. The global context structure contains the
key information required by the tool for generating the
initial global context (e.g. number of runnables, num-
ber of ports, number of inter-runnable variables) and
this information can be automatically obtained with
a simple scan of the code. The CFG of the runnables
can be automatically extracted from the C code of the
runnables using the GCC compiler with the following
developer options: -fdump-tree-cfg-blocks-vops.
The tool has been developed entirely in C++ and con-
sists of three main units: PARSER, RULES DB and
ABSTRACT ENGINE (AE), see Figure 6. PARSER
unit divides the CFG of runnables into subsequent to-
kens. AE is the core unit of the tool, it takes as input
the rules of the analysis, stored in the RULES DB unit,
14
Fig. 6 Architecture of the tool.
Fig. 7 Behaviour of AE
and the generated tokens, line by line and produces as
output an update to the global context. Within AE,
EXEC performs the abstract execution of the runnable
by analysing the tokens and looking for predefined pat-
terns. When one of these is found, EXEC adopts the
proper rule and the local and global contexts are prop-
erly updated, see Figure 7.
Runnable entities are analysed one by one. The anal-
ysis of a runnable is iteratively executed and terminates
when the local fixpoint is reached, i.e. when the local
and global context do not change after an iteration.
Once local fixpoint has been reached, AE moves on to
analyse the next runnable. When all the runnables have
been analysed, AE terminates, and the tool checks if the
global fix point has been reached, i.e., the global con-
text does not change after the execution of AE. If the
global fixpoint is reached, the tool terminates, providing
the final global context file with the port dependencies,
otherwise AE is executed again.
Fig. 8 Usage of the tool in the approach.
Figure 8 shows how to use the tool in the proposed
approach. Starting from an AUTOSAR model, ADEPT
computes for each port p, the set of ports from which
p depends (Deps(p)). Then, data secure flow property
is checked using Deps to find the lowest trust level and
the lowest security requirement of data sent on every
link. In case of violation, we change the annotations
within the Rhapsody model according to the algorithm
in Listing 2.
6 A case study
In the following, we will consider a use case related
to the Front Light Manager (FLM) tutorial described
in the standard documents of AUTOSAR [4], which is
focused on a very limited functional part of the front
light manager, namely activating the headlight and the
daytime running lights. All other lights functions ( e.g.
parking orientation light, fog lights, etc.) are excluded.
In particular, we consider a slightly extended version
of the FLM in which:
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Fig. 9 Model of the Front Light Manager.
– the headlights are turned on if the key ignition is ac-
tivated, the light switch is on and the power supply
voltage is within a specific range,
– meanwhile the daytime running lights are turned
on if the light switch is on and the voltage from the
power supply is within a specific range.
The status of the lights is reported to the driver by
means of the HMI (Human Machine Interface).
We created a model with a total of 9 components
which can be divided in 3 categories:
– Sensors components: Ignition Key, Light Switch and
Power Supply
– Actuator components: Headlight, HMI and Daytime
Running Lights
– Control components: Headlight request, Daytime
Light Request and Front Light Manager
The system model described using Rhapsody is
shown in Figure 9. All the ports between these com-
ponents are data Receiver-Provider ports. Ignition Key
and Light Switch are assumed to be simply sensor com-
ponents that outputs their status and Power Supply is
assumed to simply outputs the battery voltage, there-
fore there is no need to further develop an implementa-
tion of them. In the following we will analyse the three
control software components.
6.1 Control Software Components
The Headlight request software component is made of
three runnables entities, each with a different task:
– Runnable1 receives the data from Ignition Key and
forwards it to Runnable3.
– Runnable2 receives the data from Light Switch and
forwards it to Runnable3.
– Runnable3 receives data from Power Supply and
from the other Runnables and sends a request of
headlights activation to Front Light Manager.
The schema of the Headlight request component is
shown in Figure 10. Runnable1 and Runnable2 receive
the data from input port in1 and in2 respectively, and
forward their values to Runnable3 by means of two In-
terRunnable Variables, IRV1 and IRV2. Runnable3 re-
ceives the value of the two IRVs and the voltage value
from in3 and checks if the voltage is within a specific
range and both IRVs are ‘ON’. If so it sends a request of
headlights activation to Front Light Manager otherwise
it stops sending request.
The Rte IStatus Runnable3 RPort in3() is a func-
tion that returns the current status of the port in3, and
‘0’ means ‘no errors’. The voltage thresholds are as-
sumed to be two global parameters of the system. The
other functions are standard call to RTE functions used
to read from or write onto ports or inter-runnable vari-
ables. The Daytime light request software component
is made of only two runnables who act like Runnable2
and Runnable3 of the Headlight Request component.
The Front light manager software component is made
of three runnables:
– Runnable1 receives the request from the Headlight
Request, and forwards it to the Runnable3.
– Runnable2 receives the request from the Daytime
Light Request and forwards it to the Runnable3.
– Runnable3 forwards the data to the output ports
and sends a signal to the HMI actuator if at least 1
of the two kinds of lights is requested on.
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void HR Runnable3 (void ) {
int16 T i n p u t v o l t a g e ;
// Check por t s t a t u s (0 −−> no error )
i f ( Rte IStatus Runnable3 RPort in3 ( ) == 0){
i n p u t v o l t a g e = ( int16 T ) Rte IRead Runnable3 RPort in3 ( ) ;
}
i f ( ( i n p u t v o l t a g e >= v o l t a g e t h r e s h o l d 1 ) &&
( i n p u t v o l t a g e <= v o l t a g e t h r e s h o l d 2 ) ){
i f ( ( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV1 ( ) == KEY ON) &&
( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV2 ( ) == LIGHT ON)){
Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out1 (REQ HEADLIGHT ON) ;
}
else {




Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out1 (REQ HEADLIGHT OFF) ;
}
}
void FLM Runnable3 (void ) {
Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out3 ( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV1 ( ) ) ;
Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out5 ( ( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV2 ( ) ) ;
i f ( ( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV1 ( ) == REQ HEADLIGHT ON) | |
( Rte IrvIRead Runnable3 IRV2 ( ) == REQ DAYTIME ON) ){
Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out4 (LIGHTS ON ) ;
}
else {
Rte IWrite Runnable3 PPort out4 (LIGHTS OFF ) ;
}
}
Listing 6 Code of HR Runnable3 and FLM Runnable3.
Fig. 10 Software component of Headlight Request.
The schema of the component is shown in Figure 11.
Runnable1 receives the data from input port in6 and
forwards it to inter-runnable variable IRV1. Runnable2
receives the data from input port in7 and forwards it to
inter-runnable variable IRV2. Runnable3 forwards the
data stored in IRV1 and IRV2 to out3 and out5, re-
spectively, and if at least one of the request is ‘ON’ it
sends the signal to turn the lights on to the out4 port,
Fig. 11 Software component of Front Line Manager.
otherwise it sends the signal to turn the lights off to
the same port. The code of both FLM Runnable3 and
HR Runnable3 is shown in Listing 6.
Since the basic example of the AUTOSAR standard
considers the daytime lights as emergency lights to be
used in the case of failure of the headlights, we as-
sumed that a developer would request data input to
Daytime running lights be generated by high trusted
Data secure flow in AUTOSAR 17
software components, and the FLM to DRL link be-
tween the Front light manager and the software compo-
nent Daytime running lights satisfies integrity require-
ment. This corresponds to the annotation shown in Fig-
ure 9, where the port p of Daytime running lights is
assigned high trust level and the FLM to DRL link
is assigned integr security requirement. All the other
components and links are assigned low and none, re-
spectively.
An excerpt of the global context structure file, input



























Figure 12 reports the global context at the beginning
of the analysis of the AUTOSAR model. The position
(i, j) indicates if element i depends on port j. The boxed
region of the matrix shows dependencies between ports.
The analysis starts, assuming that each port depends
only on itself (diagonal of boxed sub-matrix equal to
1).
Using a computer with Intel Core i7-4700MQ and
12 Gb of Ram the analysis completes in 349 ms and
the global fixpoint has been reached after 3 iterations
of AE.
Figure 13 reports the global context at the end of
the analysis of the AUTOSAR model. For example, we
derive that port in6 depends on ports in1,in2,in3, in6
and out1, so Deps(in6) = {in1, in2, in3, in6, out1}
In order to check data secure flow property, the al-
gorithm in Listing 1 in Section 4 is applied. Let us
consider link FLM to DRL. From Figure 13, we de-
rive Deps(out5) = {in4, in5, in7, out2, out5}. Let L′ be
the set of links whose ports belong to Deps(out5), it is
(out2, in7) ∈ L′.
Step 1:
〈δFLM to DRL, µFLM to DRL〉= 〈high, both〉.
Step 2: ∀p ∈ Deps(out5) :
δFLM to DRL = glb(δFLM to DRL, trustlevel(cmp(p))
Let us consider port in4 ∈ Deps(out5).
It is cmp(p) = Daytime light request, whose trust level
is low.
We have:
δFLM to DRL = glb(δFLM to DRL, low) = low
Since δFLM to DRL @ trustlevel(p), data secure flow
is not satisfied.
Step 3: ∀l ∈ L′ :
µFLM to DRL = glb(µFLM to DRL, securityreq(l))
Let us consider link (out2, in7) ∈ L′, whose security re-
quirement is none.
We have:
µFLM to DRL = glb(µFLM to DRL, none) = none
Since µFLM to DRL @ securityreq(FLM to DRL),
data secure flow is not satisfied.
Using the information of AUTOSAR we assign
high trust level to all components directly or in-
directly connected to Daytime running lights, which
will lead to the assignment of high trust level to
all the other components (Front light manager, Head-
light request, Daytime light request, Light switch, Ig-
nition key, Power supply).
With our approach we can consider the data de-
pendencies of all the three components that we have
implemented and we can exploit these dependencies in
order to obtain a more efficient solution, in term of less
overhead for security operations.
In particular, the output port of Front light manager
connected to the Daytime running lights (out5 in our
implementation) does not depend on the input port
connected to the Headlight request component (in6 in
our implementation).
Data sent on the link FLM to DRL depends
on Front light manager, Daytime light request,
Light switch and Power supply software compo-
nents and traverse the following links: DLR to FLM,
PS to DLR and LS to DLR. As a consequence, data
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Fig. 12 Global Context file at the beginning of the analysis.
Fig. 13 Global Context file at the end of the analysis.
secure flow property requires that previous SWCs
are assigned high trust level, and previous links are
assigned integr security requirement. The resulting
security annotated AUTOSAR model is shown in
Figure 14.
7 Conclusions
Security in automotive systems is becoming increas-
ingly important and should be taken into account from
the early stages of the system design. There are a lot
of well-known techniques and tools that can be bor-
rowed from the information security domain in order
to deal with malicious intrusions on automotive sys-
tems. In this paper data secure flow property has been
defined, and an approach for the verification of such a
property is presented. The approach is based on infor-
mation flow analysis and abstract interpretation. The
analysis computes the lowest security level of data sent
on a communication, according to the annotations in
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Fig. 14 Annotated model of the Front Light Manager.
the model and the data causal dependencies. As to ac-
curacy, the data dependencies discovered with our ap-
proach are set at a level between the coarse grain ap-
proach of AUTOSAR and an exhaustive search of all
possible executions.
The approach has been applied to the AUTOSAR Front
Light Manager use case, using a prototype tool that
implements the abstract execution of the runnables. In
particular the application of the tool shows that the
proposed approach provides annotated models that ver-
ify secure data flow property and reduce the number of
security services, such as the number of encryption (or
hash) operations invoked by components. The modular
analysis of runnables makes the approach scalable with
respect to the size of the system.
Further studies on automotive systems can be devel-
oped to improve the efficiency of the security services,
for example it may be interesting to apply some mod-
ifications to the topology of the system to limit the
number of paths from sensors to actuators connected
to critical functions of the cars.
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APPENDIX A
This section reports the abstract rules for the instruc-
tions. In the rules we use the following notations:
– i is the bb of the CFG to which the instruction be-
longs.
– lvar is used for local variables, gvar for global vari-
ables, P for sender-receiver ports, arg& denotes ar-
guments passed by reference, ptr is used for pointers
and array for arrays.
– f() is used for functions, including runnables.
– Scope(bbi) is a function that returns the set of blocks
in the scope of the conditional instruction in bbi.
– A[δ/x] is a global context equal to A except for the
variable x that is assigned δ. Similarly, for other
elements in the global context.
– Q(M [δ/x]) is a local context equal to Q except for
the variable x in memory M that is assigned δ.
– Q(Env[δ/Env]) is a local context equal to Q except
for the environment that is assigned δ.
Some rules regarding global variables are omitted,
because they can easily be derived from the correspond-
ing rule of local variable using the global context in
place of the local memory. We note that, the level of
variables and function’s parameters, return and envi-
ronment, in the global context file A never decreases.
For example, if x is in the global context, the assign-
ment of an expression to x updates the level of x to
the lub between the current level and the level of the
expression. If x is in the local memory the assignment
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Exprconst
k ∈ const Qi = (M,σ)
〈k, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr σ
Exprvar∈lvar
x ∈ lvar Qi = (M,σ)
〈x, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr M(x) ∪ σ
Exprvar∈{gvar∪P}
x ∈ gvar Qi = (M,σ)
〈x, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr A(x) ∪ σ
Expr∗ptr∈lvar
ptr ∈ lvar Qi = (M,σ)
〈∗ptr, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr M(ptr) ∪ σ
Exprarray∈lvar
array ∈ lvar Qi = (M,σ)
〈array[j], 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr M(array) ∪ σ
Exprop
〈e1, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ1 〈e2, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ2
〈(e1 op e2), 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ1 ∪ δ2
Assvar∈lvar
x ∈ lvar 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈x:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Q(M [δ/x])〉
Assvar∈gvar
x ∈ gvar 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈x:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A[A(x) ∪ δ/x], Q〉
Assvar∈P
x ∈ P (x, y) ∈ L 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈x:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A[A(x) ∪ δ/x;A(y) ∪ δ/y], Q〉
Assvar∈arg&
x ∈ arg& 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈x:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A[f(· · · , x ∪ δ, · · ·)b ∪ δ;σ/f(· · · , x, · · ·)b;σ], Q〉
Ass∗ptr
ptr ∈ lvar 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈∗ptr:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Q[M(ptr) ∪ δ/ptr]〉
Assarray
array ∈ lvar 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈array[j]:=e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Q[M(array) ∪ δ/array]〉
If
Qi = (M,σ) Scope = {j1, · · · , jn} 〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ δ
〈if e then goto b1 else goto b2, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Qj,j∈Scope(Env[Env ∪ δ/Env])〉
Return
〈e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δ
〈return e, 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A[f(a1, · · · , an)b ∪ δ; d/f(a1, · · · , an)b; d], Q〉
Goto 〈goto bj , 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Q〉
Invoke 1
〈xj , 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr δj Qi = (M,σ)
〈f(x1, · · · , xn), 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A[f(a1 ∪ δ1, · · · , an ∪ δn)b; d ∪ σ/f(a1, · · · , an)b; d], Q〉
Invoke 2
xj ∈ arg& Qi = (M,σ) f(a1, · · · , an)b; d ∈ A
〈f(x1, · · · , xn), 〈A,Q〉〉 −→ 〈A,Q[M(xj) ∪ aj/xj ]〉
Invoke 3
f(a1, · · · , an)b; d ∈ A
〈f(x1, · · · , xn), 〈A,Q〉〉 −→expr b
of an expression to x sets the level of x to level of the
expression.
When the abstract interpreter finds a function call
it applies the three invoke rules in sequence:
– the first updates the global context with the levels
of the actual parameters
– the second updates the variables passed by reference
with the level in the global context
– the third evaluates the expression of the return of
the function using the level in the global context
When the abstract interpreter finds an assignment
to a sender/receiver port, which corresponds to a send
operation, the abstract rule updates both the value of
the sender port and the value of the receiver port in the
global context A, using the set of links L.
When the abstract interpreter finds an assignment
to a client/server port, this is transformed into a call
to the runnable implementing the service. This rule is
similar to a function call and it not shown in the figure.
